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Abstract 
Economic activity depends on agents’ real-time beliefs regarding the persistence 
in the shocks they currently perceive to be hitting the economy.  This paper uses an 
unobserved components model of forecast revisions to examine how the professional 
forecasters comprising the Blue Chip Economic Consensus have viewed such shocks to 
GDP over the past twenty years.  The model estimates that these forecasters attribute 
more of the variance in the shock to GDP to permanent factors than to transitory 
developments.  Both shocks are significantly correlated with incoming high-frequency 
indicators of economic activity; but for the permanent component, the correlation is 
driven by recessions or other periods when activity was weak.  The forecasters’ shocks 
also differ noticeably from those generated by some simple econometric models.  Taken 
together, the results suggest that agents’ expectations likely are based on broader 
information sets than those used to specify most empirical models and that the 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Economic activity depends crucially not just on the actual source of the shocks to 
the economy, but also on economic agents’ real-time perceptions of the nature of these 
shocks.  In particular, the behavior of households and businesses will depend on the 
degree to which they believe the economy is experiencing a permanent shift in its 
productive capacity as opposed to a transitory fluctuation about a trend path for output.  
For example, regardless of its ultimate persistence, a fluctuation in labor income that 
currently is perceived to be permanent will have a larger immediate impact on 
consumption and overall economic activity than one that is thought to be transitory.  
Accordingly, agents’ perceptions of shocks and how well they compare with the eventual 
path for actual output are important for the historical interpretation of business cycles.  
Furthermore, learning about factors influencing economic agents’ perceptions of shocks 
can help business cycle researchers specify theoretical and empirical models with 
expectational structures that are consistent with those observed in the economy. 
There is a long history of empirical studies investigating the decomposition of 
actual GDP into permanent and transitory components; and today the economic and 
statistical identification of these shocks are standard features of most models used in 
business cycle analysis.
 1  But there has been little work on identifying how economic 
agents have viewed fluctuations in GDP in real time.
2  This paper does so by examining 
how one group of well-informed agents--professional economic forecasters--have 
interpreted the shocks to the economy that they have experienced over the past twenty 
years.  Specifically, I estimate the persistence and propagation patterns in the shocks to 
GDP perceived by the panel of forecasters comprising the Blue Chip Economic 
Indicators Consensus Outlook.  I do so using a statistical model of the revisions to the 
short-, medium-, and long-horizon Blue Chip projections.  I also consider how the 
                                                 
1 Early statistical decompositions, such as those by Beveridge and Nelson (1981), Nelson and Plosser 
(1982), Watson (1986), Campbell and Mankiw (1987a, 1987b), Clark (1987), and Cochrane (1988), were 
based on univariate time series models for output.  Later, Shapiro and Watson (1988), Blanchard and Quah 
(1989), Cochrane (1994) and others extended the analysis to multivariate frameworks.  These studies 
produced a wide range of estimates of the relative importance of permanent and transitory shocks to GDP 
and in the patterns over which these impulses affect macroeconomic aggregates. 
2 On example is Edge, Laubach, and Williams (2004), who examine how forecasters revise their views of 
long-run productivity growth.    3
forecasters’ views of shocks compare with the results from some simple econometric 
specifications that have been used in the academic literature to identify permanent and 
transitory shocks to GDP.   
There are three broad statistical findings.  First, the Blue Chip forecasters attribute 
more of the variance in the shock to the level of GDP to permanent factors than they do 
to transitory developments.  Second, the shocks to the Blue Chip forecasts differ in a 
number of ways from those identified by the statistical GDP models.  Third, both the 
permanent and transitory Blue Chip shocks are significantly correlated with incoming 
high-frequency indicators of economic activity; and for the permanent component, the 
relationship varies with the state of the business cycle. 
Turning to the details of the results, on average, the forecasters comprising the 
Blue Chip Consensus perceive that about 30 percent of the current shock to real GDP 
reflects transitory factors while about 70 percent is due to a permanent change in the level 
of output.  This estimate of the relative importance of permanent versus transitory shocks 
is in the upper half of the range found in the literature that estimates such decompositions 
in the published GDP data and is larger than the estimates generated by most of the GDP 
models that I consider.
3  The transitory shocks are thought to have an economically and 
statistically significant impact on output for at least 1-1/2 years while the full effect of 
permanent shocks become incorporated into GDP in about one year.  These impulse 
response patterns are similar to those from most of the GDP models that I estimate. 
By construction, the revision to the forecast from an econometric model is a 
function of the model’s most recent forecast errors.  In contrast, both the permanent and 
transitory shocks to the Blue Chip forecasts are essentially uncorrelated with last-period’s 
forecast error.  Instead, the Blue Chip revisions are more heavily influenced by the 
incoming high-frequency data on economic activity.  Such data are not included in the 
statistical GDP models I consider; nor are they generally included in larger forecasting 
models, which usually project GDP based solely on quarterly aggregates from the 
national accounts.  Furthermore, there are some economically interesting relationships 
                                                 
3 As discussed below, the variance decomposition of the current-period forecast revision differs from the 
forecast-error-based variance decompositions of GDP itself made in the papers cited in footnote 1.  Section 
5 adjusts for the differences and compares the Blue Chip forecast revisions to comparable revisions from   4
between the high-frequency indicators and the shocks to the Blue Chip forecasts.  The 
correlation between the indicators and the transitory shocks does not appear to vary 
cyclically, but the correlation with the permanent shock appears to be driven largely by 
behavior during recessions or periods of sluggish growth.  There also are relatively large 
perceived permanent shocks following the 1987 stock market crash, the onsets of the 
1990 and 2001 recessions, and following September 11, 2001--events that forecasters 
thought would be associated with weak economic activity.  Though sample-size 
limitations mean these results are tentative, they do suggest that forecasters view 
recessions or shocks associated with unusual, but identifiable, events more as permanent 
reductions in output than transitory deviations in production from trend or a reallocation 
of production across time. 
The results relating past forecast errors and high-frequency indicators to the Blue 
Chip shocks suggest that there is an important difference between the information sets 
used by professional forecasters and the national income accounts data generally used to 
estimate quarterly econometric models of aggregate economic activity.  In addition, 
forecasters may process information differently if they see data or events suggesting the 
economy is threatened with a recession than if it is in the midst of an expansion.  Such 
differences can not be captured by linear econometric models with identically distributed 
error terms.  These results also are relevant for researchers seeking to construct 
expectationally consistent models of business cycle behavior. 
My empirical findings are generated using a relatively flexible unobserved 
components model of the revisions to the Blue Chip forecasts.  The model exploits the 
simple observation that only permanent shocks can affect output in the very long run.  
Thus the revision made today to the projection of GDP at a far-distant forecast horizon 
reflects only the shocks that forecasters think will be permanent.  The difference between 
these permanent shocks and the revision to the projection for current GDP then identifies 
the transitory shock.  Finally, the correlations between the revisions to projections at 
different forecast horizons reveal the impulse response patterns that describe how 
forecasters think the effects of the shocks on output will play out over time. 
                                                                                                                                                 
four time-series models that calculate permanent and transitory shocks to GDP.  I find that the Blue Chip 
attributes a larger proportion of the forecast revision to permanent factors than do three of the four models.    5
Working with the observed forecast revisions eliminates the need for a detailed 
analysis of how the projections actually are constructed.  This is useful because the Blue 
Chip forecast is not the simple unadulterated output of a single statistical model with a 
corresponding mechanical representation of shocks and impulse responses.  Instead, 
many forecasters comprise the Blue Chip panel, and virtually all of them make 
judgmental adjustments to model projections or base their forecasts on a wide range of 
statistical and anecdotal sources.  Nonetheless, regardless of how the forecasts are 
constructed, any time a forecaster revises a projection, he or she takes a stand on the new 
information they think will influence GDP and the degree to which the shocks will either 
dissipate over time or become permanently embedded into the economy.  These 
judgments can be inferred from the observed forecast revisions.  Throughout the paper I 
will refer to these judgments as forecasters’ perceptions of the permanent and transitory 
shocks.  This terminology highlights the fact that the shocks are not generated by any 
particular statistical model and that they are real-time evaluations that never undergo ex-
post adjustments to calibrate them to the actual path for GDP that eventually transpired.   
 
2.  The Data 
 
2.1 The Blue Chip panel and data availability 
 
Many private- and public-sector economists regularly sell macroeconomic 
forecasts to clients or release them to the public.  One of the most widely used summaries 
of such projections is the “Consensus Outlook” published by the Blue Chip Economic 
Indicators.  The Blue Chip Consensus is the simple arithmetic average of the projections 
made by the Blue Chip panelists.  There are 52 forecasters in the current panel. 
The Blue Chip Consensus is interesting for a number of reasons.  First, the 
forecasts are made by the economic staffs at major investment banks, financial services 
firms, large commercial banks, industrial companies, economic consulting firms, and 
university-affiliated forecasting projects.  Accordingly, the projections encompass 
expectations for the macroeconomy held by organizations making large financial 
commitments or selling services to business clients.  Second, the Blue Chip Consensus is   6
commonly used as a benchmark against which to compare other forecasts.  For example, 
both the Administration and Congressional Budget Office compare their official forecasts 
with the Blue Chip Consensus in their annual analyses of the United States Budget.  
Third, the average is likely the most important moment of the distribution of forecasts 
with regard to how expectations may feedback onto aggregate activity.  One reason is 
that the Consensus averages out perennially optimistic or pessimistic forecasters.  Indeed, 
Bauer, Eisenbeis, Waggoner, and Zha (2003) show that the Consensus does a better job 
in predicting calendar-year average growth rates than the projections of most of the 
individual forecasters. 
On the 10
th of each month, Blue Chip publishes a Consensus forecast for each 
quarter in the current and subsequent calendar years.  This projection period is too short 
to separately identify transitory events expected to last a year or two from developments 
expected to have a permanent impact on the level of economic activity.  However, twice 
a year the Blue Chip surveys its respondents for projections covering the next 12 years.  
In addition to the regular quarterly projections, each March and October the panel also is 
queried for calendar-year annual forecasts for each of the next 6 years and for the average 
pace of activity over the subsequent 5-year period (the 7 through 12-year-ahead forecast 
period).
4  These forecasts thus provide semi-annual information on how forecasters 
interpret the effect of incoming shocks on the path of GDP both over the next several 
quarters and for many years to come.
5  Since I need to observe near-, medium-, and long-
horizon forecasts made at the same point in time, this paper uses only the forecasts made 
in March and October.   
Let gdp(t+k) be the value of the logarithm of real GDP k periods from now and 
ftgdp(t+k) be the forecast made in period t of gdp(t+k); k = 0, 1, 2, …K.  As a practical 
matter, forecasters provide projections for GDP growth, ftΔgdpt(t+k) = ftgdp(t+k) -  
ftgdp(t+k-1).  Given that I observe forecasts two times a year, I work with semi-annual 
time series of projections for half-year periods.  Specifically, when t is in March, the k = 
                                                 
4 The individual Blue Chip forecasts are not available at the quarterly or long-run forecast horizons—they 
are only published for the averages of the current and next calendar-year.   
5 The Blue Chip a better suited for studying shocks and propagation than another popular forecast data set, 
the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF).  The SPF publishes forecasts for average growth over a 10-
year period.  However, the SPF only began doing so in 1992; it only conducts the long-run survey once a 
year; and the SPF medium-term forecasts are limited to the current and subsequent four quarters.    7
0 forecast is of growth between the fourth quarter of the previous year and the second 
quarter of the current year; the k=1 forecast is of growth between the second and fourth 
quarters, and so on.  If t is in October, the k = 0 forecast is for growth between the second 
and fourth quarters of the current year.  In March, forecasts for k = 0, 1, 2, 3 can be 
constructed from the quarterly projections; in October, the quarterly numbers can 
generate forecasts for k = 0, 1, 2.  For larger k, I interpolated the 2 through 6-year-ahead 
annual projections to the half-year frequency to generate semi-annual projections for up 
to k = 9.  The long-run GDP forecast, ftΔgdp(lr), denotes the forecast of average growth 
made at time t for the 7 through 12-year-ahead period.  The complete set of short-, 
medium- and long-term forecasts begins in March 1982; the sample I use runs through 
the first half of 2005.  Appendix 1 provides further details regarding timing conventions 
and the methodology used to distribute the annual forecasts to a semi-annual basis. 
 
2.2  The historical data 
 
Figure 1 presents some of the data.  The time axes in the graphs denote the period 
being forecast.  The solid lines in each panel are forecasts for half-year growth rates: the 
top-left panel plots forecasts made for the current half-year period (k = 0); the top-right 
panel the projection of semi-annual growth made one-half year earlier (k = 1); and the 
bottom panels the forecasts made one-year earlier (k = 2).  The dashed lines in the top 
and lower left panels are the actual values for GDP growth as estimated by the third or 
final NIPA estimates.
 6  The dashed line in the lower-right panel is what forecasters were 
assuming for long-run growth at the time the forecast was made.  The shading marks 
recessions as designated by the NBER. 
The figure highlights several characteristics of these forecasts (see Krane 2003 for 
further details).  First, the short-term forecasts can move around substantially, particular 
during periods of economic weakness.  In contrast, the medium and longer-run forecasts 
are much smoother.  Indeed, as seen in the lower-right panel, even the one-year-ahead 
forecast appears to be fairly well anchored by the assumptions for longer-run growth.    8
Second, the forecast errors can be large.  As seen in table 1, the root-mean-squared error 
(RMSE) for growth in the current half-year period is about 1-1/2 percentage point; the 
RMSEs for the longer-horizon forecasts are between 1-3/4 and 2 percentage points.  
These RMSEs compared with a standard deviation in actual half-year growth of about 2 
percentage points.  As seen in the graphs, the increase in the RMSEs at longer horizons 
largely reflects the fact that these forecasts vary only modestly from the long-run growth 
projections and therefore miss recessions.  Third, the assumptions concerning long-run 
growth exhibit low-frequency variation; notably, they drifted down during the late 1980s 
and then moved up rather rapidly around the turn of the millennium.  
Although the forecast errors are large, they pass some simple tests for rationality.  
As seen on the first column of table 1, the mean errors are not statistically different from 
zero.  More formally, in the regression: 
 
 () () ( ) tt gdp t k a b f gdp t k e k Δ+ = + Δ+ + (1) 
 
ftΔgdp(t+k) fails as a rational forecast of Δgdp(t+k) if the joint null hypothesis that a = 0 
and b = 1 is rejected.  As seen in the last column of table 1, one cannot reject this 
hypothesis for any value of k in the Blue Chip data.  That said, this is not a resounding 
victory: with the exception of the k = 0 forecast, a often is well above zero and b well 
below one, but the standard errors are large enough that one cannot reject the null. 
Figure 2 looks at the relationship between the current state of the economy and 
the projected path for GDP growth.  The solid lines plot the differences between the 
forecasts for semi-annual growth made k periods ahead and the assumption for long-run 
growth at that time, ftΔgdp(t+k) - ftΔgdp(lr).  The time axis refers to the dates the 
forecasts are made.  The dashed line is the most recent value of the three-month moving 
average in the Chicago Fed National Activity Index, or CFNAI-MA3, that is known at 
time t.  The CFNAI-MA3 is an index that captures the comovment in 85 monthly 
indicators of economic activity.  Thus, it measures common information about economic 
                                                                                                                                                 
6  Note that I assume forecasters were not predicting the effects of comprehensive revisions of the NIPA; 
accordingly the actual data in 1999, 1995, 1991, and 1985 were adjusted by the average changes in long-
run growth that occurred with the comprehensive revisions to the NIPA in those years.   9
activity contained in a wide range of high-frequency indicators available to the 
professional forecasters.
 7 
In the near term (k=0, 1), we see a large positive correlation between ftΔgdp(t+k) - 
ftΔgdp(lr) and the CFNAI-MA3.  This indicates that forecasters are building in some 
persistence of the current observed strength or weakness in the economy into their 
projections for the next year.  For longer-run forecasts (k = 2, 4), however, there is a 
negative correlation between ftΔgdp(t+k) - ftΔgdp(lr) and the current state of the 
economy.  This suggests that forecasters are looking for some future offset to current 
high or low rates of growth.  However, it is not clear from the graphs to what degree 
medium-term forecast adjustments offset near-term movements.  To the degree that they 
do, the forecasters think the shocks hitting the economy are transitory; to the degree that 
they do not, the forecasters perceive a permanent element in the shocks hitting the 
economy.   
Of course, these characterizations are only suggestive.  Importantly, we do not 
know how much of the swings in the CFNAI-MA3 reflect informational surprises.  And, 
as just noted, the relative scale of the various adjustments is unclear.  For these, I turn to a 
more formal statistical model.  
 
3.  A Statistical Model to Identify the Perceived Shocks to GDP 
 
3.1  A model of forecast revisions 
 
This section presents a model of forecasters’ real time views regarding the size 
and persistence of the shocks to GDP that they observe.  The model is based on some 
general assumptions about how forecasters view the time series properties for GDP. 
Specifically, I assume that the forecast of the logarithm of GDP is the conditional 
expectation:   
 
                                                 
7 The CFNAI is the first principle component of 85 monthly time series measuring production, 
employment, sales, construction, orders, and inventories.  The index is normalized to have a value of zero 
when all of the indicators are moving along their long run trends.  Given publication lags, the monthly   10
  () [() |] tt f gdp t k E gdp t k += + Ω  (2) 
 
where Ωt is the information set used to construct the forecasts.  I make no assumptions on 
whether or not Ωt encompasses a formal model of economic activity.  I do, however, 
assume Ωt reflects a view that gdp(t) is the sum of a permanent or trend component, 
gdp
p(t), and a transitory component, gdp
tr(t).  The change in the permanent component of 
GDP includes an expected average trend rate of growth, αt.  As in any business cycle 
model, the permanent component reflects the underlying production technology and 
wealth endowment of the economy, while the transitory component represents monetary 
policy shocks, temporary changes in production possibilities, or factors that shift the 
allocation of spending across time.  Accordingly, as one looks ahead from time t to time 
t+k, the actual value of gdp(t+k) will converge to gdp
p(t+k) as the transitory factors run 
their course and gdp
tr(t+k) approaches zero.  These properties are summarized in the 
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In order to isolate the perceived shocks to these components, I will work with the 
change made between period t-1 and period t in the forecast of period-t+k GDP; this 
forecast revision is denoted ft 
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indicators in the CFNAI-MA3 are generally between one or two months old.  For more information on the 
CFNAI, see Evans, Chin, and Pham-Kanter (2002).   11
 
Because the revisions are changes in conditional expectations, they reflect the new 
information that forecasters choose to incorporate in their GDP projections.  These 
shocks cause revisions to the forecasts of both the permanent and transitory components 
of GDP, ft 
rgdp
p(t+k) and ft 
rgdp
tr(t+k), respectively.
 8  The variability in the ft 
rgdp(t+k) 
and the correlations between the ft 
rgdp(t+k) and ft 
rgdp(t+j) (revisions made at the same 
point in time to projections of GDP at different forecast horizons) thus can be used to 
identify both the perceived permanent and transitory shocks to output and how the shocks 
are expected to propagate or dissipate over time.  But to identify the shocks and response 
patterns, I need to specify a parametric time-series model for the forecast revisions.   
I assume that two factors may cause forecasters to revise their projections for 
permanent GDP.  The first is et, a shock that causes a permanent increase in the level of 
GDP.  The shock is normalized to have a unit impact on the projection for output in the 
current period.  Forecasters, however, may believe it takes a few periods before et 
completely work its way into output; it’s effect on gdp
p(t+k)--the impulse response--is 
measured by the parameter, θk.
 9  The complete impact is assumed to take R periods, so 
that θk = θR  for all k ≥ R.  The second factor that can cause a revision to the outlook for 
permanent GDP is a change in forecasters’ assumptions of the average long-run growth 
rate in GDP, which I denote wt; after k periods, this would cumulate into a revision in the 
outlook for gdp
p(t+k) of kwt.  I assume that wt is observable and equal to the change in 
the long-run forecasts made at time t and t-1, ftΔgdp(lr) – ft-1Δgdp(lr). Because shocks to 
tastes and technology that could lead to changes in gdp
p(t+k) may cause both a jump in 
the level and a permanent change in the growth rate of output, I allow for a covariance, 
θlr, between et and wt.  In sum, then, the revision in the level of permanent GDP is: 
 
                                                 
8 See Berger and Krane (1985) for a discussion of the use of forecast revisions to identify the information 
sets used by forecasters’ and to test for broader concepts of forecast efficiency.  
9 This differs from many univariate models decomposing permanent and transitory changes in GDP, which 
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I also assume that transitory factors influence GDP; the perceived transitory shock 
in period t is denoted by ut.  The impact of ut on the current level of GDP is normalized to 
unity.  This shock may influence GDP for some time, and the impulse response on 
gdp
tr(t+k) is measured by the parameter, ρk.  However, because it is transitory, the effect 
of this shock eventually dissipates to zero; the model incorporates this restriction by 
assuming there is some J ≥ 0 such that ρj = 0 for j > J.  This means that the revisions to 
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  I also assume that ut is independent of et and any changes in assumptions about 
long-run growth at all leads and lags.  All of the shocks are assumed to have conditional 
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Given equations (5), (6), and (7), the observed revisions made at time t to the 
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where, for convenience, I set R = J-1.    
Note that if the forecasts were being mechanically generated from a single semi-
annual statistical model of the economy, then the forecast revisions--and hence wt, et, and 
ut--would be functions of only the model’s last forecast error.  But there is no such model 
underlying the Blue Chip Consensus.  Instead, wt, et, and ut reflect any and all 
information that forecasters build into their projections at time t.  Importantly, the 
forecast error learned in period t reflects only the news revealed in gdp(t-1) (since GDP is 
published with a lag); but a host of additional factors influencing current and future GDP 
also are learned at that time, and these will be included in the shocks in my model.
10  
Note, though, that a transitory shock learned today that is thought to influence GDP only 
in period t-1 would not show through in ut.  This means that the variance decomposition 
of the k = 0 forecast revision could attribute more variation to the permanent shock than 
many of the forecast-error based decompositions of actual GDP estimated in the 
literature. 
 
3.2  Identification 
 
The system of equations (8) is my basis for estimation.  In particular, the 
structural parameters can be recovered from the variance-covariance structure of the  
ft 
rgdp(t+k).  This structure is:   
                                                 
10 This is particularly important since I am working with semi-annual data, and a good deal of such 
information becomes available during a half-year period.  Furthermore, as discussed in appendix 1, the 
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The system of equations (9) is useful for thinking about identification and estimation.  A 
natural candidate for an estimator is a method-of-moments system constructed by 
substituting the sample analogs for the theoretical moments in (9).  Because J is large, 
there are enough moment conditions to solve for all of the σ
2’s, θk’s, and ρk’s.  Indeed, 
since there are more equations than unknowns, there exist more efficient estimators then 
simple method-of-moments.  In particular, similar moment conditions are embedded in 
the likelihood function defined by the Kalman filter model described below, and 
parameter estimates and can be obtained by maximum likelihood.  The Kalman filter also 
produces estimates of et, and ut. 
As a practical matter, forecasters provide projections for GDP growth.  The 
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I estimate (10) using the Kalman filter and construct ft 
rgdp(t+k) from Σi≤k ft 
rΔgdp(t+i).   
 
3.3  Aggregation and measurement error 
 
  The Consensus forecast is the simple average of the projections of the individual 
members in the Blue Chip panel.  As such, the model of forecast revisions is meant to 
capture the average perceptions of shocks and propagation patterns.  For it to do so, I 
need to add measurement error to the model. 
Let the subscript “i” denote the i
th forecaster’s forecast revisions (fit
rΔgdp(t+k)),  
perceptions of permanent and transitory shocks (wit, eit, uit), and coefficients on the 
dissemination processes (θik, ρik).  The fit
rΔgdp(t+k) are specified as in (10) with “i” 
subscripts on the parameters and shocks.  The Consensus values for each of these 
variables and parameters are then the simple averages of the N forecaster-specific values. 
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Because all the idiosyncratic factors average out, the k = 0 revision reflects the average of 
the individual forecasters’ views of the permanent and transitory shocks.  Similarly, for k 
> J, the consensus revisions accurately reflect wt.   
  However, for 0 <  k ≤ J, the Consensus forecast revision contains forecaster-specific 

















() ( ) ()
1






it ik ik it ik ik it
ii i
N
t k k t ik ik k k it
i
N
k k t ik ik k k it
i


















=+ − + −
=+ − + − −−







This revision differs from the average effects modeled in equation (10) by the terms in 
the summations over eit and uit.  Without information on individual forecasts, we cannot 
estimate these extra terms.  Instead, I model them as measurement errors, vt(k),  
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to be added to equation (10) for 0 < k ≤ J.  I assume E[vt(k)
2] = σ
2
vk; E[vt(k) vτ(j)] = 0 for 
all t and τ, and j ≠ k, and E[vt(k) et] = E[vt(k) ut] = E[vt(k) wt] = 0 for all k and t.
11 
 
3.4  Making the model operational:  the state space representation 
 
Define the following matrices: 
 
                                                 
11 As discussed in appendix 1, measurement error also is induced into the system due to the fact that for 
periods beyond which the quarterly forecasts are published, the semi-annual projections are constructed by 
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The vector St is an unobserved state variable.  The observed forecast revision process, 
F




tt t F GDP BS v Δ= +  (14) 
 
The log likelihood function for the revision process (excluding constants), L, and the 
Kalman filter updating equations for the state variables are: 
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Estimates of the θ’s, ρ’s, σ
2’s can be obtained by maximizing the likelihood function and 
estimates of the fundamental shocks ut, et, and wt can then be found by applying the 
Kalman filter updating equations. 
Note that because k = 0, 1, … 9, I set J =  9.  The full set of revision series run 
from the second half of 1982 the first half of 2005.  This means I have 23 years of semi-
annual data and 10 revisions with each observation, leaving 460 observations.  Of course, 
given that the half-year forecasts are interpolated from annual data beyond k = 3, as a 
practical matter, I am effectively working with 322 independent observations.  The model 
contains 29 parameters.  
 
4.  Estimation Results 
 
4.1  The revision process 
 
Table 2 shows the model estimates.  The first and third columns show the 
parameters directly estimated by (15), the revisions to growth (in annual rates), ρk - ρk-1, 
and θk - θk-1, while the second and fourth columns give the implied revisions (in 
percentage points) to the level of GDP.







and θlr.  Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. 
Consider first the transitory shocks.  After raising growth on impact, these shocks 
have little effect on projected growth for the next year.  They then reduce growth over the 
following year and a half as GDP returns to its permanent level.  In terms of the level of 
GDP, the ρk indicate the transitory shocks have an economically meaningful influence for 
                                                 
12 Because the forecasts are recorded as semi-annual growth at an annual rate, I need to multiply the ρk and 
θk by 0.5 to calculate the effects on the level of GDP.   19
about 2 years but then dissipate quickly.  The effect of the shock is statistically significant 
for 1-1/2 years.  The sum of the coefficients is 1.15.  This means that integrating over 
time, the transitory factors are perceived on average to produce a net positive or negative 
change in GDP from its permanent level as opposed to a zero-sum shift in the timing of 
output between today and tomorrow. 
Turning to the permanent shock, one interesting result is that its projected effect 
does not occur entirely at the time of the shock:  θ1 - θ0  = 0.27, indicating an additional 
27 basis point (annual rate) increase in output in the half year following the shock.  But 
with a t-ratio of 1.6, this extra growth effect has only marginal statistical significance. 
That said, the extra boost does not dissipate; this is seen in the coefficients for the effects 
on the level of output, which are above 0.6 for all k > 0.    Accordingly, there is some 
suggestive evidence that forecasters believe et  is not a simple random walk, though given 
the standard errors, one cannot reject the hypothesis that these gains are no greater than 
the impact effect at the usual levels of statistical significance. 
As seen in the bottom row of the table, the variance of the permanent shock, σ
2
e, 
is more than twice as large as the variance of the transitory shock, σ
2
u.  Accordingly, two-
thirds of the changes that forecasters make to their projections of GDP in the current half-
year reflect perceptions of permanent gains or losses in output.  Finally, θlr = 0.04; this 
correlation between et and wt indicates that forecasters see a small positive relationship 
between a permanent shock to the level of output and a perceived change in the trend 
growth in GDP.  This relationship, however, is not statistically significant. 
 
4.2  The scaled responses and variance decomposition 
 
Figure 3 combines the shock and response information by plotting the revisions to 
the k-period-ahead forecasts of the level of GDP scaled by the standard errors of the 
shocks.  The upper panel plots the effect of the transitory shock, σu ρk; the middle panel  
the effect of the permanent shock, σe θk; and the bottom panel the combined effects of the 
permanent shock and the shock to long-run growth, k[σ
2
e (θk -  θk-1) + σ
2
w + 2 θlr]
1/2.  The 
horizontal axes plot the forecast horizon, k.  The panels also plot two-standard error 
bounds for each set of responses; these are calculated from bootstrapping the σuρk, σeθk,   20
and [σ
2
e (θk -  θk-1) + σ
2
w + 2 θlr]
1/2.  Table 3 gives the corresponding decomposition of 
the variance of the revision between transitory and permanent components and 
measurement error. 
As seen in the upper panel of the figure, the scaled transitory effects are 
statistically significant for up to a year and a half.  Furthermore, any noticeable future 
offsetting response in production is of marginal statistical significance.  As seen in the 
middle panel, the upslope in the response to the permanent level shock, et, differs from 
the flat line one would see if gdp
p(t) were a random walk; though given the standard 
errors, there is little statistical significance in this pattern. Finally, in the long-run, the et 
and wt shocks together add to growth at a rate of one-tenth of a percentage point per year 
(lower panel).  
With regard to the variance decomposition (table 3), the variance of the revision 
to the level of output in the current half year period is 0.33 percentage point (not at an 
annual rate).
 13  Of this, about one-quarter is assumed to reflect transitory factors, two-
thirds the permanent et shocks, and the remaining 6 percent the shock to long-run growth, 
wt, and its interaction with et.  Only between 12 and 15 percent of the k = 1 and k = 2 
revision variance reflects transitory factors, while et accounts for 58 to 66 percent.  
Naturally, over time, the revisions to the trend growth become increasingly import; wt 
and cov(et,wt) account for nearly 30 percent of the level revision by 2-1/2 years.  
Measurement error accounts for about 15 percent of the variance in the k ≥ 2 revisions.  
Recall the interpretation of measurement error as the variability in forecaster-specific 
views of shocks and impulse responses about the average view captured by the 
Consensus.  The small amount of variability in the total revision that this error accounts 
for suggests a strong tendency for individual forecasters’ perceptions of economic events 
to cluster around a viewpoint common to all of the Blue Chip panelists.   
To sum, forecasters believe that transitory shocks influence the path of real GDP 
over the next 1-1/2 to 2 years.  The transitory factors are perceived to largely reflect net 
positive or net negative influences on production for some limited period of time as 
opposed to a shift in a fixed level of output between today and tomorrow.  Even in the   21
near-term, however, permanent shocks are believed to be a more important influence on 
output than transitory shocks.  Finally, the forecasters may not believe that the permanent 
factors are best modeled as a simple random walk, but may instead take some time to 
become fully reflected in GDP.  
 
4.3  The time series of the shocks 
 
Figures 4a and 4b plot the perceived shocks to GDP.  The solid lines in the top 
panel of each figure are the transitory shocks, ut, the solid lines in the middle panels are 
the permanent shocks to the level, et, and the solid lines in the bottom panels are the 
changes in the long-run growth rate, wt.  The ut and et plotted here are the values of the 
unobserved components generated by the Kalman smoother.
14   The shaded periods mark 
NBER recessions.  Figure 4a compares ut, et, and wt with the error learned in time t for 
the k = 0 forecast made in time t-1, gdp(t-1) – ft-1gdp (t-1) (shown by the dashed lines in 
each panel).   The bottom panel of figure 4a also compares wt with the average revisions 
to historical growth in the GDP that occurred with comprehensive revisions to the 
national income accounts in 1985, 1991, 1996, and 1999 (the bars; see appendix 1).   
Figure 4b compares the shocks to the incoming information on the current state of the 
economy as summarized by the CFNAI-M3 in the second month of semi-annual period t 
(the dashed lines). 
First, comparison of the ut and et in the top two panels of both figures highlights 
the greater variability in the permanent shock.  For example, 17 values of et are greater 
than 3/4 percentage point in absolute value and 10 are greater than 1 percentage point; the 
corresponding counts for ut are just 10 and 3.  Second, there are some large negative 
permanent shocks at the times of discrete events that hit the economy; notable ones occur 
with the stock market crash in 1987, the onsets of the recessions in late 1990 and early 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 Recall that the revisions to the level are not at annual rates.  The revision in the level is 0.5 times the 
revision to the semi-annual growth rate, so the 0.33 percentage point level revision variance equals 0.25 
times the 1.31 percentage point variance in the k=0 growth rate revision cited earlier.    
14 By construction, the forward filtered ut and et are serially uncorrelated, but there is no reason for the 
smoothed estimates to be.  Still, a regression of ut, on ut-1 finds a small and statistically insignificant 
coefficient.  The et are also serially uncorrelated.  That said, ft 
rΔgdp(t) itself exhibits some serial 
correlation; a regression of it on ft-1 
rΔgdp(t-1) yields a coefficient on the lag of 0.37 and an adjusted R
2 of 
0.14.  However, the ft 
rΔgdp(t+k) for k>0 are not correlated with any ft-1 
rΔgdp(t+j), j ≥ 0.    22
2001, and the forecast following September 11, 2001.  Indeed, if these four observations 
are excluded, σ
2
u changes little but σ
2
e falls by about one-third.  Apparently, forecasters 
saw these events as unusual but identifiable discrete shocks that had the potential to 
noticeably and permanently disrupt economic activity without any offsetting recovery in 
production once events had run their course.   
Next, consider the relationships between the shocks and the forecast errors shown 
in figure 4a.  There are not any obvious regular relationships between these errors and ut, 
et, or wt.  There are, however, a few interesting case studies.  One was in the mid 1980s, 
when there appears to be some negative correlation between the forecast errors and both 
shocks.  Apparently forecasters were having trouble judging the timing of the strong 
recovery from the 1981-1982 recession.  This episode seemed to influence forecasters 
later in the decade, when there were several negative valuations for both et and wt.  
Another interesting period was during the boom of the late 1990s.  Here, a string of 
positive forecast errors led to two years of small upward revisions to the permanent level 
of output and an upgrading of views regarding long-run growth.  Finally, the 
comprehensive revisions to the national income accounts appear to have influenced 
forecasters to revise their perceptions of the long-run growth rate of output, particularly 
so with the 1999 revision.   
Turning to figure 4b, the CFNAI-MA3 and ut exhibit some positive comovement 
throughout the sample period, consistent with the evidence shown in figure 2.  The 
CFNAI-MA3 and et move together during recessions, but no clear pattern emerges during 
other periods.  And other than during the late 1990s, the changes in perceptions of long-
run growth and the CFNAI-MA3 appear to be uncorrelated. 
In order to provide some statistical description of these relationships, table 4 
presents a regression of the k = 0 forecast revision on the forecast error in last period’s k 
= 0 forecast and the last four months of CFNAI-MA3 data that became available between 
the times the t-1 and t forecasts were made.  The first column considers the total revision 
while the second and third columns run separate regressions for the revisions due to the 
transitory and permanent shocks.   
As seen by the p-values reported in the table, despite the examples in the 1980s 
and 1990s noted above , the previous half-year’s GDP forecast error has virtually no   23
statistical explanatory power for the current-period revisions.  In the eyes of the Blue 
Chip forecasters, their previous forecast error does not consistently reveal useful 
information about the course of activity going forward.  In contrast, the CFNAI-MA3 
data are highly statistically significant in all three regressions.  The effect is strongest in 
the equation for the transitory shock; indeed a simple regression of ut on the CFNAI-M3 
terms has an R
2 of nearly 40 percent.   
Furthermore, there is some statistical support for the pattern found in figure 4b of 
forecasters reacting more to incoming data during periods of economic weakness.  The 
third and fifth columns in table 4 allow for a separate coefficient on the most recent 
CFNAI-MA3 value known at time t if it is less than -0.5.  This occurs in 7 of the 46 semi-
annual observations.
15  The coefficient is statistically significant in the regressions for the 
overall revision; indeed, it drives out the statistical significance of the other CFNAI-MA3 
variables.  In the regression for the transitory shock, the threshold CFNAI-MA3 variable 
has a coefficient of -0.22, indicating that forecasters perceive some offset to recessionary 
declines in output from higher production in latter periods.  However, the magnitude of 
this offset is small and the coefficient is not close to being statistically significant.  In 
contrast, the threshold variable has a coefficient of 1.26 and a p-value of 0.02 in the 
regression of the permanent shock; its inclusion even drives out the statistical influence 
of the other CFMAI-MA3 variables in the regression.
16  
These regressions are consistent with forecasters believing that large permanent 
declines in output characterize recessions.  This contrasts with say Friedman’s (1964) 
“plucking” model in which recessions represent a drop in output and then a recovery to 
trend--and thus reflect a temporary loss in production--as well as alternative models in 
which the lost output is made up for by above trend production sometime during the 
subsequent expansion.  It is, however, consistent, with the permanent losses in output 
found in Hamilton’s (1989) Markov-switching model of recessions.  Furthermore, the 
large negative values for et following the stock market crash in 1987 and September 11, 
                                                 
15 The specific dates are 1982:H2, 1990:H2, 1991:H1, 1992:H1, 2001:H1, 2001:H2, and 2003:H1.  
Accordingly, 5 fall during recessions and 2 during periods of sluggish recovery.  
16 A univariate regression of et on the negative threshold CFNAI-MA3 variable has an R
2 of 0.23, the same 
as the base regression.  Note also that if I instead put a positive threshold CFNAI-MA3 variable (values 
greater than 0.5) in the regression, its coefficient is small and statistically insignificant (-0.32 with a p-value 
of 0.21).    24
2001 are consistent with the idea that forecasters think such special and readily 
identifiable adverse shocks will generate unusually large permanent reductions in 
economic activity.  Of course, with only three recessions and a couple of such special 
events in the sample, one should not overemphasize the statistical substance of these 
results.  Still, they suggest that forecasters think that the data generating process for GDP 
differs between recessions and expansions.  Linear models with independent and 
identically distributed error processes cannot encompass such a view of the business 
cycle.
17 
In addition, the correlations between forecast revisions and incoming high-
frequency measures of economic activity are instructive for empirical modeling.  First, 
the correlations suggest that these indicators may be useful additions to the lagged 
endogenous variables typically employed to instrument expectational variables in Euler 
equations or current-period variables in structural vector autoregressions.  Second, the 
linkage between expectations and the high-frequency indicators may help explain why 
such variables prove helpful in modeling the term structure of interest rates (see, for 
example, Ang and Piazzesi (2003) and Evans and Marshall (2002)).  Namely, the term 
structure incorporates expectations for the path of economic activity from today through 
the long run; and according to my results, high frequency indictors appear to be important 
determinants of changes in agents’ expectations of both transitory fluctuations in GDP 
and permanent shifts in economic activity.  
 
 
5.  Comparing the Results to Time Series Models for GDP 
 
5.1  Some statistical models for permanent and transitory shocks to GDP  
 
The specification above motivates the separation of forecast revisions into 
permanent and transitory components from a simple univariate time series model for 
GDP.  So it is natural to ask how the Blue Chip revisions compare with the 
                                                 
17 This result also suggests that the state-space model (13) can be improved by incorporating some type of 
non-standard specification for σ
2
e that recognizes the possibility of large negative realizations of et during 
recessions or periods following unusual economic events.   25
decompositions into permanent and transitory shocks generated from statistical 
specifications of the process for actual GDP.  Are forecasters patterning their perceptions 
of shocks along the lines estimated by these models? 
This section compares the Blue Chip forecast revisions with comparable forecast 
revisions from four time-series models for GDP.  Because these models generally are 
estimated using quarterly data, one needs to aggregate their impulse responses to the 
semi-annual frequency.  As described in appendix 2, if the Wold representation of a 
quarterly univariate statistical model for forecasting GDP growth 
 
 
* (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) L gdp t L t ωε −=  (16) 
 
where ω*(L) is a square sumable lag polynomial with ω*0 = 1 and ε(t) is the shock or 
vector of shocks to GDP, then there exists the following semi-annual correspondence 
between the Blue Chip revisions and those from the quarterly statistical model: 
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I consider four simple econometric models that are designed to identify both a 
permanent and a transitory shock to real GDP and how these shocks propagate over time: 
the Beveridge-Nelson (1981) decomposition; a univariate unobserved components (UC) 
model similar to Clark (1987) or Campbell and Mankiw (1987a, b); the Blanchard-Quah 
(1989) bi-variate structural VAR in GDP growth and the level of the unemployment rate; 
and the Campbell-Krane (2005) multivariate structural VAR.  The Beveridge-Nelson 
decomposition assumes gdp
p(t) follows a random walk and that Δgdp(t) can be described 
by an ARMA model.  The UC model assumes both Δgdp
p(t) and gdp
tr(t) follow ARMA   26
processes. The Blanchard-Quah model identifies the transitory shock to GDP through the 
assumption that it has no effect on the long-run level of GDP.  The Campbell-Krane 
model is a 6-variable VAR in private GDP, nondurables and services consumption, 
durables consumption and residential investment, the federal funds rate, core PCE 
inflation, and food and energy inflation.  In the spirit of Cochrane (1994), it identifies the 
permanent shock by restricting it to be the only shock in the VAR that has a long-run 
influence on the level of consumption.  It is the only one of the models also explicitly 
designed for forecasting.  Appendix 2 describes the models in more detail.    
 
5.2 Estimation results 
 
I use AIC and BIC information criteria to identify the models, picking an AR(2) 
model in the growth rate in GPD in the Beveridge-Nelson case; a simple random walk for 
gdp
p(t) and an AR(2) for gdp
tr(t) in the UC model, and a third-order VAR in the 
Blanchard-Quah case.  Campbell-Krane used similar specification criteria to choose lag 
length and contemporaneous zero restrictions in their model.
18  
Figure 5a compares the Blue Chip forecast revisions to permanent and transitory 
shocks (scaled by the standard deviations of the shocks) with those implied by the two 
univariate models for GDP.  The black and blue lines in each panel replot the scaled Blue 
Chip revisions shown in figure 3 and their two-standard error bounds.  The green lines in 
the top two panels are the GDP model estimates of the impulse responses of a transitory 
shock on the level of GDP; the green lines in the bottom panels are the model responses 
to a permanent shock.  Figure 5b shows plots for the multivariate models.  As seen in the 
graphs, there are noticeable differences between the scaled impulse responses of the 
models and of the Blue Chip forecasts.  
                                                 
18 The first three models are estimated using currently published quarterly data for the period 1967-2005.  I 
chose to start in 1967 because in 1982, the first year in my Blue Chip sample, forecasters undoubtedly 
would have been considering the history of the previous 15 years when making there assessments of the 
shocks hitting the economy.  I also decided to give the model some “extra” information by estimating 3 
different constant terms to allow for changes in long-term growth—one for the period 1967-1973; one for 
1974-1995, and one for 1996 and on.  This was done since αt is observed to change over time. For reasons 
discussed in their paper, the Campbell-Krane model is estimated using data from 1984 onwards.  Note that 
the Campbell-Krane model does not identify a single transitory shock; the transitory shock referred to in 
this paper is the covariance weighted average of the 5 transitory shocks found in the model.   27
Qualitatively, the pattern of the Blue Chip revisions to transitory shocks 
resembles those in the UC, Blanchard-Quah, and Campbell-Krane models:  the entire 
initial shock remains in the level of GDP for about a year and then dissipates quickly 
towards zero.  However, the magnitudes of the responses are much different.  All three of 
these models see the transitory shock inducing forecast revisions of between 1 and 1-1/2 
percentage points of GDP over the next year, while the Blue Chip innovation in response 
to a transitory shock is about 1/3 percentage point.  The initial response of the Blue Chip 
forecasters to a transitory shock is of similar magnitude to that from a Beveridge-Nelson 
decomposition.  However, the Beveridge-Nelson transitory shock only has a palpable 
effect on the k = 0 forecast, as compared with longer-lived effects in the Blue Chip.   
With regard to the permanent shock, both univariate models assume et follows a 
random walk, while the multivariate models share the Blue Chip feature that the impulse 
from a permanent shock takes some time to feed into GDP.  The Blue Chip and 
Blanchard-Quah impulses share a similar upward sloping pattern, while the Campbell-
Krane impulses exhibit some hump shaped behavior.  The variances of the permanent 
shock are of similar magnitude in all of the forecasts with the exception of the Beveridge-
Nelson decomposition, where it is about three times the size of the Blue Chip.  
 
5.3  The influence of high-frequency data on the differences between the revisions from 
the Blue Chip Consensus and the econometric models 
 
One reason that the impulses and shocks differ across the Blue Chip and model 
forecasts is the difference in conditioning sets.  The revisions to the statistical GDP 
models’ projections are functions of lagged forecast errors.  Accordingly, they are 
functions only of GDP in the Beveridge-Nelson and unobserved components models, of 
GDP and the unemployment rate in the Blanchard-Quah specification, and of private 
GDP, consumption, durables and residential investment, interest rates, and inflation in the 
Campbell-Krane model.  In contrast, the revisions to the Blue Chip forecasts encompass 
any information forecasters care to incorporate.   
As seen in section 4, the Blue Chip forecasters appear to discount the persistence 
of past forecast errors but revise their projections noticeably in response to the   28
information contained in high-frequency indicators of economic activity.  By 
construction the econometric models do not ignore their past errors; but what would the 
responses of these models look like if they incorporated high-frequency data?   
I reran all of the time series models using the value of the CFNAI-MA3 in the 
third month of quarter t-1 as an exogenous explanatory variable.  Table 5 shows the 
standard deviations of the k = 0 forecast revisions--which are the sum of all the period-t 
shocks--for the Blue Chip forecasts, the base case statistical models, and the statistical 
models that include the CFNAI.   
The base-case (left-hand columns) illustrate the results cited in the discussion of 
the impulse responses in section 5.2:  with the exception of the transitory Beveridge-
Nelson and permanent Blanchard-Quah shocks, both the permanent and transitory shocks 
to the Blue Chip are smaller than the corresponding shocks in the models’--and often 
substantially so.  And the Beveridge-Nelson model is the only specification that attributes 
at least as high of a share of the revision variance to the permanent shock as the Blue 
Chip does.
19  
The standard deviations of the GDP models’ k = 0 revisions are markedly smaller 
when the CFNAI is added to their specifications (right-hand columns).  Furthermore, 
incorporation of the CFNAI eliminates all of the transitory shock estimated by the 
univariate Beveridge-Nelson and UC models.  The standard deviations of both shocks in 
the Blanchard-Quah model are now nearly identical to those in the Blue Chip, and the 
variation in the transitory shock Campbell-Krane model is much closer to the Blue Chip.  
That said, the pattern of the impulse responses in the Blue Chip and adjusted Blanchard-
Quah models (not shown) differ substantially: the adjusted Blanchard-Quah transitory 
response declines linearly to zero instead of having a hump shaped.  Furthermore, the 
correlation between that model’s k = 0 forecast revision and the Blue Chip’s is small (10 
percent).  In contrast, the impulse response pattern in the Campbell-Krane model does not 
                                                 
19 Of course, part of the reason that the Blue Chip revision may be small is that the Consensus forecast is 
the simple arithmetic average of about 50 individual forecasts. To the extent that averaging smooths out 
idiosyncratic reactions, the variance in the Consensus’ forecast revisions will be less the average variance 
of the revisions made by the individual forecasters.  While individual quarterly forecasts are not available 
for the Blue Chip panel, some subgroup averages are.  As described in appendix 3, these subgroups can be 
used to calculate a potential upper bound for the smoothing effect.  The calculations suggest the standard 
deviation of the Consensus forecast revision understates the average standard deviation of the individual 
forecasters’ revisions by only about 20 percent.   29
change much from the base case; it merely shifts down by the change in the standard 
deviation of shocks. Still, like the Blanchard-Quah model, the correlation between the 
adjusted model and Blue Chip revisions is small (12 percent). 
In sum, the Blue Chip forecast revisions more resemble those of multivariate 
models of GDP than the univariate decompositions.  Even with these models, however, 
there are important differences between the revision processes.  Some of the differences 
in the variation in the shocks may reflect the use of the incoming high-frequency data by 
the Blue Chip forecasters.  In particular, the differences in the standard deviations close a 
good deal when the CFNAI-MA3 is added to the statistical models; nonetheless, the 
models still produce a much different pattern of behavior than is implied by the Blue 




This paper uses a statistical model of the forecast revisions to infer forecasters’ 
implicit decomposition of news into permanent and transitory shocks to GDP.  According 
to this model, on average, the forecasters comprising the Blue Chip Consensus perceive 
that about 30 percent of the shock to real GDP reflects transitory changes while about 70 
percent is due to a permanent change in the level of output; expect transitory shocks to 
dissipate in about 1-1/2 to 2 years; and believe there may be a half-year delay before the 
entire permanent shock to GDP is in place in the data.  These results differ a good deal 
from those of some small-scale models designed to identify permanent and transitory 
shocks to GDP:  the total shocks to the Blue Chip forecast are smaller than the models’, 
and their decompositions generally see a much larger role for transitory shocks.   
One reason for the differences between the models’ and the Blue Chip results 
likely revolves around the fact the Blue Chip forecasts are much more heavily influenced 
by the incoming high-frequency data on economic activity then by past forecast errors.  
This effect is particularly pronounced during recessions or periods of economic 
weakness.  The results also suggest that forecasters see downturns or expected periods of 
sluggish activity associated with unusual, but identifiable, events as comprising more 
permanent then transitory reductions in output.   30
One lesson of this paper is that even for broad aggregates such as GDP, agents’ 
expectations are likely based on a good deal more information than what is incorporated 
into quarterly econometric models using data from the national income accounts.  In 
addition, the result that expectations are more sensitive to incoming data during economic 
downturns then during expansions suggests that it may be fruitful to consider models that 
allow for shock processes or propagation mechanisms to differ according to the state of 
the business cycle.  These observations are relevant for researchers who are attempting to 
build internally consistent expectations into equilibrium models of the business cycle or 
are considering how to more efficiently capture expectations in econometric models.   31
Appendix 1.  Data Issues  
 
1.  The timing relationships between the March and October Blue Chip surveys and the 
national income accounts.  
I let the data for March represent the first semi-annual period of the year and the 
data for October the second semi-annual period.  At the time the October Blue Chip is 
published, the most recent published National Income and Product Account (NIPA) data 
are the third, or “final,” estimates for the second quarter.  This means the most recent 
history is a final estimate of growth for the previous semi-annual period--the fourth 
quarter of last year to the second quarter of the current year.  In March, the most recent 
historical NIPA semi-annual data are the second estimates for growth between the second 
and fourth quarters of the previous year.  The revisions between the second and third 
estimates of the NIPA usually are small.  Accordingly, while the most recent history in 
March is not quite the final estimate for growth in the second half of the previous year, it 
is not too far from it (annual revisions aside--see below).  Still, the October forecasts 
contain one more month of data for the t = 0 semi-annual period.  I could have accounted 
for this difference by including additional measurement errors to the model, but chose not 
to do so for reasons of parsimony. 
 
2.  Modeling the k = 0 forecast revisions instead of the forecast errors. 
As noted in section 3, wt, et, and ut reflect the shocks to the k = 0 forecast, not the 
shocks thought to have hit GDP in period t-1.  An alternative structure would have been 
to start the model with the forecast error for last-period’s GDP, which is also the k = -1 
forecast revision,  
  1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) .
r
tt f gdp t gdp t f gdp t − −= −− − (18) 
 
Note that this error is learned at time t.   
As discussed in section 3.1, one reason to prefer the k = 0 over the forecast errors 
is that the latter exclude important information relevant to the GDP forecast.  Others 
relate to well-known difficulties in defining forecast errors that mean they likely contain 
measurement error that is not be present in the k = 0 revisions.  In order to isolate the true 
forecast error, one needs to know if forecasters are predicting the first-published GDP   32
estimate or a revised number (see McNees, 1973).  If they are predicting revised data, 
then it is necessary to substitute a value for gdp(t-1) learned after period t into equation 
(18).  So one must decide on the appropriate revised value to use--the one associated with 
the final quarterly number, or perhaps one following an annual revision--and also 
separately identify the information learned with each revision to the estimate of GDP.  
Errors in specifying the data being forecast or differences between the vintages of GDP 
being projected by the panelists add measurement error to the model and thus complicate 
the identification of shocks.  The issue is particularly problematic for this paper because 
at the semi-annual frequency, forecasters learn two quarters of data instead of one 
between each observation.  The use of forecast revisions starting with period k = 0 avoids 
all such issues:  Since no published values for GDP are needed to construct the revisions, 
there is no need make any judgment on the vintage of GDP that is being forecast. 
Major revisions to the national accounts are another problem.  Annual revisions 
are published each July, and four comprehensive revisions to the NIPA also occurred 
during the sample.
20   The annual and comprehensive revisions fold in a wide range of 
information from annual surveys, quinquennial economic censuses, and other data 
sources that do not strictly reflect new information learned between time t-1 and t.  The 
revisions--particularly the comprehensive ones--can also include changes in statistical 
methodologies.  Accordingly, the forecast errors made in periods spanning these 
revisions will reflect a variety of measurement issues in addition to the fundamental 
economic shocks affecting activity and thus their use would add measurement error to my 
model.  In contrast, the k = 0 revisions that span such periods will reflect only the 
information forecasters think are of consequences for future growth.   
 
3.  Distribution of annual forecasts to semi-annual frequency.   
I first construct the annual average levels implied by the k = 0 through k = 3 
forecasts made in March or the k = -1 through k = 2 forecast made in October.  I then 
                                                 
20 This means that any forecast errors between the March and October projections reflect the effects of the 
annual revisions.  The comprehensive NIPA revisions took place in December 1985, December 1991, 
January 1996, and October 1999, which influences forecast errors for the second halves of 1985, 1991, 
1995, and 1999.  In general, no annual revisions are made to the NIPA if a comprehensive benchmark is to 
come later in the year.   33
apply the published Consensus average annual growth rate forecasts for 2 through 5-year-
ahead to these data to calculate annual levels for these years.   
I then distribute the annual numbers to half-year levels according to an algorithm 
that minimizes the difference in the change in GDP between adjacent semi-annual 
periods subject to the constraint that the averages of half-year levels equal the annual 
level.  That is, it chooses ftgdp
l(t+k) and ftgdp
l(t+k+1) to minimize Σ ηt+k




l(t+k,t+k+1) where the “l” superscript refers 
to the level of GDP, k is the first half-year period, k+1 is the second half-year period, 
ftgdp




l(t+k-1) + ηt+k 
ftΔgdp
l(t+k+1) = ftΔgdp
l(t+k) + ηt+k+1 
 
The resulting levels are used to construct half-year growth rates for k ≥ 4 (for March) and 
k ≥ 3 (for October).
21  I generate forecast up through k = 9.  Conceptually, the 6-year-
ahead forecasts would allow me to interpolate values for k = 10 and k = 11 as well; I 
chose not to do so to avoid any end-point issues that may arise with the interpolation 
procedure. 















λ is a weight between 0 and 1, the βi(L) are second-order lag polynomials that capture the 
smoothing of changes, and β1(L) + β3(L) =  β2(L) + β4(L) = 0.  So while this smoothing 
adds some measurement error to the resulting forecasts, by construction, the errors 
                                                 
21 This means there is a slight difference between how the semi-annual growth rates are measured for small 
k—which are second-to-fourth and fourth-to-second quarter changes—and the larger k—which are first-
half-to-second half and second half-to-first-half changes.  Any measurement errors due to differences 
between two-quarter and half-year growth rates will be absorbed by the vt(k).  (This difference could have 
been avoided by distributing the annual data to the quarterly frequency; the cost of doing so would have 
been additional measurement error induced by the distribution process.)   34
average out over the two halves of the year.  Note, too, that any such measurement error 
will be absorbed in the vt(k). 
As an alternative to this procedure, one could estimate the model using the 
published revisions to annual-average forecasts.  The revision to the annual forecast for 
the log level of GDP is log[0.5*{exp((k+1)wt + θk+1et + ρk+1ut) + exp(kwt + θket + ρkut)}], 
which does not lend itself to the linear structure of the Kalman filter described in section 
3.  One could instead use the first-order Taylor expansion of the annual forecast revision 
about wt = et = ut = 0, which is 0.5*[(2k+1)wt + (θk+1+θk)et + (ρk+1+ρk )ut] + vt’(k+1,k), 
where vt’(k+1,k) is measurement error.  But by construction, vt’(k+1,k) will be correlated 
with wt, et, and ut;; accounting for these correlations requires a significant number of 
parameters and complicates the structure of the Kalman filter.  In contrast, any 
measurement error added by the distribution algorithm described above averages out over 
the two halves of the year.  This means while the individual θk and ρk may be bias for k ≥ 
3, the estimates of θk+1 + θk and ρk+1 + ρk will be unbiased. 
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Appendix 2:  Econometric Models 
 
1.   The Beveridge-Nelson (1981) decomposition.   
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*(1) ( ) ( 1) .... (1) ωε τ ε τ ε +− + +  represents the permanent component of GDP and 
()() L φ ετ is the transitory component.  The decomposition is calculated by first 
estimating an ARIMA model for the growth in GDP, finding the Wold representation, 
and then calculating (19). 
2.  Univariate unobserved components model.  
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ut is the shock to transitory output and et is the shock to permanent output.  This implies 
an observation equation for gdp growth: 
 
 












Δ= + +  (21) 
 








u can be estimated 
using the Kalman filter.  
 
3.  Blanchard-Quah bivariate VAR representation of GDP and the unemployment rate. 

















⎣⎦ ∑  (22) 
 
where C(0) is a 2 by 2 identity matrix and ν(t) is a 2 by 1 vector of reduced form errors 
with covariance matrix Φ.  This model can be used to separate permanent from transitory 
shocks to GDP by assuming that shocks to the unemployment rate can not have a 
permanent effect on the level of GDP.  This is done by considering the Wold 

















⎣⎦ ∑  (23) 
 
where the ε(τ) are a 2 by 1 vector of structural errors.  The Blanchard-Quah assumption is 
equivalent to saying that the lower right-hand entry of A(1) equals zero.  This imposes the 
restriction that lower right hand entry of C(1)A(0) is zero and that A(0)A(0)’ = Φ. 
 
4.  The Campbell-Krane model. 
This model is a 6 variable VAR in:  1) the log difference in personal consumption 
expenditures for nondurables and services excluding housing (C); 2) the log ratio of 
private GDP (Y) to C; 3) the log ratio of expenditures for consumer durables and 
residential investment (D) to C; 4) the federal funds rate; 5) PCE inflation excluding food 
and energy; 6) inflation in PCE food and energy.  The model is based on the ideas that: 1) 
the permanent income hypothesis implies that any permanent shock to the productive 
capabilities of the economy will alter C and; 2) balanced growth implies that Y/C and 
D/C will be stationary.
22  This means the permanent shock to production can be identified 
by restricting it to be the only shock that has a long-run impact on C and by restricting 
                                                 
22 As a practical matter, the ratios Y/C and D/C and PCE inflation excluding food and energy exhibit some 
important low-frequency variation.  Accordingly, as discussed in Campbell and Krane, the model is 
estimated in deviations of these variables from their 40-quarter lagged moving average.   37
any shock in the model from having a long-run impact on Y/C, D/C, or the other 
variables in the VAR.
 23   
A couple modifications are necessary to make the model compatible with the other 
data presented in the paper.  First, the impulses to log Y are calculated by adding the 
impulses to log(Y/C) and log C.  Second, the impulses to transitory shocks represent the 
weighted sum of the responses of Y to all other shocks in the system other than the 
permanent income shock.  Finally, the impulse responses of Y are multiplied by the ratio 
of the standard deviation of total GDP to the standard deviation of private GDP to give 
appropriate scaling relative to the impulses presented in the papaer. 
5.  Derivation of equation (17). 
Consider the Wold representation of a quarterly univariate statistical model for 
forecasting GDP growth: 
 
* (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) L gdp t L t ωε −=  (24) 
 
where ω*(L) is a square sumable lag polynomial with ω*0 = 1.  It is convenient to work 















so that the revision to the q-quarter-ahead forecast made at time t can be written as:  
 
  () ( )
r
q f gdp t q t τ ωε +=  (26) 
 
The k = 0 Blue Chip projection is the outlook for real GDP in the second quarter 
of the current half-year period.  Since data for the first quarter of the half year are not yet 
known (see appendix 1), this corresponds to a two-quarter-ahead (q = 2) forecast.  In 
                                                 
23 The relative importance of transitory shock to the one-step-ahead forecast error estimated by the 
Campbell-Krane model is similar to that found in Cochrane (1994), who used data for 1947-1989.  Both of 
these models identify the permanent shock by allowing it to be the only one affecting consumption in the 
long run.  These results thus indicate that the use of consumption to identify permanent shocks generalizes 
from Cochrane’s simple bivariate system to a larger-scale restricted VAR and to the “post-great-
moderation” sample period (see also, Campbell and Krane).    38
general, the k-period-ahead semi-annual forecast corresponds to a 2k+2-quarter-ahead 
forecast.  In terms of forecast revisions, the k = 0 revision, for example, reflects the 
difference between the q = 4 forecast made in semi-annual period t-1 and the q = 2 
forecast made in semi-annual period t.  In terms of quarterly forecasts this is the sum of 
the revisions between consecutive q = 4 and q = 3 forecasts and q = 3 and q = 2 forecasts.  
Suppose period t is the first half of the year; then this revision is the sum of the influence 
of first e(Q3) and then e(Q4) onto the projection for GDP in the following second quarter.  
In terms of (1.11), the total revision is: 
 
  12312 (3 ) (3 ) (3 ) (4 ) (4 ) QQQQQ ωε ωε ωε ωε ωε ++++ 
 
More generally, we have the following correspondence between the semi-annual Blue 
Chip revisions and those from the quarterly statistical model: 
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Statstical Model f gdp t k e -2 -1
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   39
Appendix 3  The Influence of Averaging Forecasts 
 
The Consensus forecast is the simple arithmetic average of about 50 individual 
forecasts. To the extent that averaging smooths out idiosyncratic reactions, the 
Consensus’ forecast revisions will be less variable that the revisions that the individual 
forecasters make.  How might this smoothing influence the empirical results?   
The k = 0 period forecast revision of each individual forecaster i, fit
rgdp(t), may 
be written as the sum of the Consensus (average) forecast and an idiosyncratic 
component, zit, which reflects the range of views on the permanent and transitory shocks 
to output.  By construction Σ i=1,50 zit = 0.  As a statistical matter, I assume the zit are mean 
zero and independently and identically distributed across forecasters and are independent 
from the consensus revision: 
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Note that the set up in equation (28) allows for the possibility for forecaster fixed effects; 
that is, for some forecasters to always predict that growth will be higher or lower than 
average.  These fixed effects, however, are differenced out in the forecast revisions. 
Individual forecasters’ quarterly projections are needed to calculate σ
2
z directly, 
and the only individual forecasts published by the Blue Chip are for growth on a 
calendar-year average basis for the current and subsequent year.
24  However, since 1992 
                                                 
24 For example, in terms of the semi-annual frequency I am working with, the forecast made in March for 








l(H1t) is the level of gdp in half-year i of year t and the subscript M refers to the fact that the 
forecast is being made in March.  In October, the forecast (the subscript O) for calendar-year average 





l(H2t-1)].  Accordingly, the forecast 
revision between March and October reflects both the forecast error for growth in the first half of the year   40
Blue Chip has been publishing quarterly forecasts for the average of the highest 10 
forecasts made by the panelists and for the average of the lowest 10 forecasts.  If these 
forecasters were the same individuals each time period, then the assumptions behind 
equation (28) would mean that the differences between the revisions to the consensus 
forecasts and the revisions to the group made up by combining the top-10 and bottom-10 
forecasters would be observations on Σi=1,20 zit/20 and the variances of the differences 
would be estimates of σ
2
z/20.  The forecasters in the top and bottom 10 averages are not 
the same across periods.  But the forecasters moving into and out of these groups are 
more likely to have done so because they made a larger revision than the average 
forecaster.  This means that the variance of the differences between the consensus and 
subgroup revisions likely overestimate σ
2
z/20, and so can be used to bound σ
2
z.
 25  
I constructed time series of Σ zit/20 from the top 10 and bottom 10 averages and 
estimated σ
2
z’s from a 5000 replication boostrap of this time series.  This gave an 
estimate for σ
2
z of 0.16.  The bootstrap estimate of Var[ft 
rgdpt(t)] of 0.28, so that under 
the assumptions in equation (28), the average standard deviation of the individual 
forecasters’ k = 0 revisions is 0.66 percentage point.  This compares with a 0.55 
percentage point standard deviation for the Consensus revisions over the 1992-2005 
period.  So the Consensus forecast understates the average variability of the individual 
forecasters by only about 20 percent.
26  
Furthermore, it is unlikely that smoothing out the idiosyncratic variation means 
that the relationships between individual forecaster’s revisions and the incoming data 
differs substantially from what was estimated using the Consensus outlook.  I regressed 
the time series for Σ zi/N from the top 10, bottom 10, and combined subgroups on the 
same CFNAI data and realized forecast error as shown in table 4.  None of the variables 
were statistically significant in explaining the Σ zi/N.  This supports the view that the 
                                                                                                                                                 
and the revision to growth in the second half of the year, and so cannot be used to back out the appropriate 
semi-annual series. 
25 Intuition also says that Σ Δzit/10 > 0 for the top ten average and Σ Δzit/10 < 0 for the bottom ten.  
However, Σ Δzit/10 is -0.03 for both series. 
26 Of course, the bottom and top 10 averages likely are not random draws from the consensus pool.  Indeed, 
one would not want to assume that the forecasts themselves are random distributed about the consensus 
outlook:  some forecasters will always be optimistic and some will always be pessimistic.  However, the 
assumption that the revisions are randomly distributed about the consensus revision is less stringent since 
the revisions difference out any forecaster fixed effects.  Combining the top 10 and bottom 10 averages also 
should help produce more efficient estimates of σ
2
z.   41
idiosyncratic components of individual forecasters’ revisions are relatively random 
disturbances about the Consensus and not systematically related to the incoming data.  42
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics for the Blue Chip Consensus Forecast Errors 
 
 Errors  () () ( ) tt gdp t k a b f gdp t k e k Δ+ = + Δ+ + 
Forecast 
Horizon, k 





































Standard errors in parentheses.  p-values for a=0, b=1 test based on Newey-West 
corrections for autocorrelation in et(k)    45
 
 




Response to Transitory Shock  Response to Permanent Shock 
 Growth 




θk – θk-1 
Level 
0.5 θk 
0  1.00 0.50 1.00 0.50 
 NA 
 
NA NA NA 
1 -0.06  0.47  0.27  0.63 
 (0.27) 
 
(0.13) (0.17) (0.08) 
2  -0.06 0.44 -0.00 0.63 
 (0.26) 
 
(0.17) (0.15) (0.11) 
3 -0.33  0.28  0.04  0.65 
 (0.16) 
 
(0.22) (0.12) (0.15) 
4 -0.46  0.05  0.08  0.69 
 (0.21) 
 
(0.27) (0.15) (0.20) 
5 -0.41  -0.16  0.07  0.72 
 (0.20) 
 
(0.30) (0.15) (0.26) 
6  -0.11 -0.22 -0.02 0.71 
 (0.15) 
 
(0.26) (0.09) (0.27) 
7  0.13 -0.15 -0.09 0.67 
 (0.23) 
 
(0.16) (0.11) (0.25) 
8  0.18 -0.06 -0.06 0.63 
 (0.20) 
 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.23) 
9  0.13 0.00 0.00 0.63 



















Forecast horizon k corresponds to semi-annual periods.  Standard errors in parentheses.  
NA indicates a fixed parameter with no standard error. 
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Table 3:  GDP Level Forecast Revision Variance Decomposition 
 
Contribution to the Variance of the Forecast Revision 










Shock, ut  et w t  cov(et,wt) 
Measurement 
Errors, vt 
0 0.33  0.27  0.66  0.01  0.05 0.00 
1 0.53  0.15  0.66  0.02  0.08 0.08 
2 0.58  0.12  0.58  0.05  0.11 0.15 
3 0.63  0.04  0.58  0.07  0.14 0.16 
4 0.70  0.00  0.58  0.11  0.17 0.14 
5 0.78  0.01  0.54  0.13  0.18 0.13 
6 0.83  0.02  0.49  0.17  0.19 0.13 
7 0.83  0.01  0.42  0.22  0.20 0.15 
8 0.85  0.00  0.37  0.26  0.21 0.15 
9 0.93  0.00  0.34  0.30  0.22 0.15 
   47
 
Table 4:  The Influence of Forecast Errors and the Current State of the Economy  
on the k = 0 Blue Chip GDP Forecast Revisions 
 
 Revision 


































    R
2  0.37 0.43 0.41 0.43  0.23  0.33 
p-values in parentheses 
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Table 5:  Effect of Including CFNAI in the GDP Models 
 
  Standard Deviations of k = 0 Forecast Revisions 
  Base Models  Models with CFNAI 








Beveridge-Nelson  1.65 0.12 1.53 1.03 0.00 1.03 
Unobserv.  Comp.  1.41 0.91 0.65 0.99 0.00 0.99 
Blanchard-Quah  1.71 1.19 0.29 0.64 0.42 0.46 
Campbell-Krane  1.52 1.33 0.56 0.77 0.60 0.37 
Memo:    Blue  Chip  0.57 0.31 0.46 0.57 0.31 0.46 
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Figure 1:  GDP Forecasts
Half-Year Growth (annual rate)
Forecast for Growth in the Current Period











Forecast for Growth Made One Year Earlier











Forecast for Growth Made One-Half Year Earlier











Forecast for Growth Made One-Year Earlier and Long-Run Growth
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Figure 2:  The Current State of the Economy and the GDP Forecasts
Deviations from Long-Run Growth Forecast
Forecast for Growth in the Current Period
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Figure 3:  Responses to Shocks: Revisions to Forecasts for the Level of GDP
Scaled by Standard Deviation of Shocks; with Two Std-Error Bounds
Response to Transitory Shock











Response to Permanent Shock











Response to Permanent and Long-Run Growth Shocks








Figure 4a:  Perceived Shocks to GDP and Forecast Errors
Transitory Shocks to the Level of GDP
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Figure 4b:  Perceived Shocks to GDP and the Current State of the Economy
Transitory Shocks to the Level of GDP
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Figure 5a:  Responses to Shocks:  Blue Chip and Univariate Models
Responses Scaled by Standard Deviations of the Shocks
Response to Transitory Shock
Compared with Beveridge-Nelson
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Figure 5b:  Responses to Shocks:  Blue Chip and Multivariate Models
Responses Scaled by Standard Deviations of the Shocks
Response to Transitory Shock
Compared with Blanchard-Quah
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